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BOOK REVIEWS
itself by breaking completely and finally with her
husband, and by filing a formal suit for divorce.
She also "joined" Narcotics Anonymous, a new
movement not as yet accepted by the Probation
Department and by other health and welfare
agencies. It was the N.A., as "competitor" of this
writer, which made her terminate her sessions
with him. It seems, however, doubtful whether
this patient can be considered as "cured," even
though she has not been addicted for a year, and
has held some jobs fairly steadily.
To sum up: most patients, and the drug-addict
in particular, should be treated through a "frontal"
attack on all sides, enlisting the relatives to a
maximal degree, and through reaching out; i.e.,
being permissive and being available at all times,
if necessary. This case seems noteworthy because
it appears that, among several hundred cases of
drug-addicts which the writer dealt with, Dinah
was the only patient with whom a fair degree of
progress was measured. No claim is made as to
any scientific method or measurement or validity
as to the treatment of drug-addicts as a species
sui generis.-Hans A. Illing, Los Angeles, Cal.
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KIENN,'s OumT!nsEs op CrGqAL LAW. Seven-
teenth edition. By J. TV. Cecil Thriter. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, 1958.
pp. Lxiv + 628. $11.00.
The first edition of this book, which has long
been the leading student textbook on criminal law
in England, was published in 1902. The preface
stated that "some excuse seems necessary for add-
ing to the now redundant stores of English legal
literature another elementary manual of Criminal
Law." The author underestimated his contribution
as shown by the fact that in the ensuing 47 years
sixteen editions have appeared. His work has been
widely read not only in England but in the United
States. It has been translated into French and
Italian. The author of this review when writing
about criminal procedure in the United States
and comparing it with English procedure has
habitually turned first to Kenny and then to
other English treatises.
The sixteenth and seventeenth editions of
Kenny have been produced by Mr. Turner. The
sixteenth edition, published in 1952, represented
many important and comprehensive changes from
.the previous fifteen. The thirteenth edition, pub-
lished in 1929, was the last edition done by Pro-
fessor Kenny himself. The fourteenth and fifteenth
editions were edited with but few changes by G.
Godfrey Phillips, an English barrister. His main
additions were concerned with blackmail, sedition,
industrial disputes, and child destruction. There
was a sixteen-year lapse between the fifteenth
and sixteenth editions, hence Mr. Turner had every
incentive to make many changes.
This book is notable for its comprehensiveness.
Not only does it cover the substantive criminal
law but also criminal procedure, and what is more,
criminal evidence. About ninety pages are de-
voted to evidence and about the same number to
criminal procedure, and a little over four hundred
to the substantive criminal law. There seems to
be no -American textbook in one volume giving
such comprehensive coverage.
The original author, Professor Kenny, had a
special flair for vivid illustration. The revisions
of this volume have not destroyed this happy
quality. The eleventh footnote on page 183 gives
information on the correct methods of kissing. A
judge is quoted as instructing the grand jury as
follows: "If a man kisses a young woman against
her will and with feelings of carnal passion and
with a view to gratify his passions or to excite hers,
that would be an indecent assault. The kisses of
young people in seasons of universal gaiety are not
indecent, but kisses given by a man under the in-
fluence of carnal passion are indecent."
As in the United States so in England many
anachronisms remain in the substantive criminal
law, such as blasphemy and seditious libel, common
scolds, night walkers, forestalling, regrating and
ingrossing. There is need for legislation to correct
the many deficiencies, uncertainties and ob-
solescences in the substantive criminal law. This
book should encourage the reform of English law.
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While Mr. Turner denies any "claim or pretense"
that this volume be regarded as "a work on crim-
inal jurisprudence," the book is nevertheless of
a critical and analytical character. It does not,
like Archbold, merely attempt to summarize the
existing law. The author in separate writings has
made original contributions to the law of mens rea
and criminal attempts, and weaves them into the
book though sometimes in very condensed form.
The author has recently published an eleventh
edition of Russell on Crime, covering 1900 pages,
so that some of the research there involved must
have proved useful in preparing the present edi-
tion of Kenny.
How does this volume differ from the sixteenth
edition? There is considerable discussion of the
Homicide Act of 1957. There is consideration of
the judicial changes in the law of larceny. A good
many new cases, four hundred in. all, have beeu
treated, and the volume is fifty pages longer. With
respect to obtaining credit by fraud, Appendix I
on the "Meaning of Credit" is extremely helpful.
Students of evidence will find Appendix II useful.
It is entitled "Rules as to Admission of Evidence
which reveals to the jury Facts Discreditable to
the Person Accused." Appendix III, on "Forms
of Indictment," sets out forms as to capital murder,
accessory after the fact to murder, manslaughter,
arson, and larceny. There is no appendix, as in
the sixteenth edition, on "The Nature of a Crime,"
but this subject is dealt with briefly in the first
five pages of the book.
The value of the index has been much improved
by givAig references to page numbers as well as
section numbers. Usually the author refers to
statutes by their short titles, but now and then
unfortunately to their regnal years and chapters.
This book is notable for its clarity, its accuracy,
its conciseness, its critical analysis (not however
ignoring the lessons of experience) its erudition,
and its literary style. It is one of the best legal
textbooks ever written, whether in the field of
criminal law or any other legal subject.
LESTER B.. ORFIELD
Indiana University Law School
THE CRIMINAL MIND. By Philip Q. Roche, M.D.
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958. Pp. 299.
$5.00.
This book is an "expanded statement" of the
author's Isaac Ray Award Lectures. Its' main
thesis is that difficulty in communication between
law and psychiatry is due to differences in concepts
and verbal constructs.
Legal concepts such as intent, malice, willfulness
and premeditation, says Dr. Roche, are
abstractions that "explain nothing." Their use-
fulness "is limited as a kind of paraphernalia in
the rituals of guilt fastening." They are
"attenuated demonological concepts which have
no consonance with modern individual-centered
psychology." The criminal trial is "an operation
having a religious meaning essential as a public
exercise in which the prevailing moral ideals are
dramatized and reaffirmed," "a kind of exorcism"
by which the triers contrive "simultaneously and
unconsciously to sanction the acting out of the
defendant, find vicarious gratification in it, and
morally to condemn it."
This psycho-analysis of the public attitudes and
emotions in administering and upholding the
criminal law provides some valuable insights into
the psychological well-springs of our traditional
reactions to antisocial behavior, but surely it is
something less than the whole truth. All that has
been thought and written from the time of Plato
to the present on the concept of crime and the
purpose of punishment, and all the correctional
practices from nith songs to probation, can hardly
be explained simply in terms of an emotional
catharsis.
Dr. Roche would reject all the law's "verbal
impediments to sharing experience," in favor of
"a field-theoretical approach to behavior with
concepts of process, multiple and reticular causality
and with a circular system of social interaction."
"To the psychiatrist," he says, "intent has the
meaning of a behavioral event, the precursors of
which operate within the accused in a structured
manner having an instinctual source and having a
flow into final pathways of action .... Mental life
is a continuous processing of behavioral events in
part distributed in alloplastic actions upon the
environment combined with a variable part
absorbed autoplastically." Passages such as these
are difficult for many lay readers to understand.
Perhaps the most important proposal that Dr.
Roche makes is that the psychiatrist should
refuse longer to act as a "moral inquisitor" in
criminal trials; he should refuse to testify to the
ultimate question of mental responsibility, that is,
whether the defendant's mental condition was
such as to satisfy the test in force in that state
(whether he knew right from wrong, etc.). By
[Vol. so
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restricting the medical testimony to the description
of the medical diagnosis, and insulating the
psychiatrist from the ultimate question of
responsibility, "we are keeping our symbols
straight and pure."
Even under the Durham rule, Dr. Roche would
have the psychiatrist testify only to the question
of mental disease or defect but not to whether the
crime was a "product" of such disease or defect.
He prefers the Durham rule to the M'Naghten
test, mainly because under Durham, "the expert
is less imposed upon to transpose scientific obser-
vation into value judgments, less restricted to an
intellectual exercise focused exclusively on a
single aspect of the svbjeci, e element of a crime."
But insofar as, under Durham, the expert is asked
to give an opinion on whether the criminal act
was the "product" of the defendant's mental
disorder, it, like M'Naghten, asks him not for a
scientific diagnosis, but for a subjective determi-
nation of moral responsibility -a question that
the court or jury, and not the psychiatric expert,
can and should resolve. The "product" concept
he feels is based on the reasoning that mental
disease dissipates capacity to form a criminal
intent, and so it perpetuates the word-magic of
manipulating verbalisms-intent, cause, product.
[This last point is probably unsound; the court
in the Durham case was careful not to adopt the
"criminal intent" rationale that had been offered
in State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871)].
Kot only should the psychiatrist refuse to
participate in determining responsibility, but the
law itself should give up this concept and adopt
the view that all felons are mental cases. "Criminals
differ from mentally ill people only in the mamer
we choose to deal with them."
The most effective use of psychiatric data, Dr.
Roche believes, is not in the criminal trial on the
issue of responsibility, but before and after the
trial-in advising on the question of whether the
accused is mentally fit to stand trial and in advising
on the appropriate disposition of the convicted,
the devising of techniques for rehabilitation and
reform of convicted persons and advising on the
ieadiness and safety for release.
HENRY W EIHOFEN
University of New Mexico
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, "SENTENC-
ING", Vol. XXIII, no. 3, Summer, 1958. School
of Law, Duke University. Pp. 184. $2.00
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, "CRIME AND
CORRECTION", Vol. XXIII, no. 4, Autumn, 1958.
School of Law, Duke University. Pp. 201. S2.00
These two issues of "Law and Contemporary
Problems" seek to examine three very important
aspects of the field of criminology. The first issue,
which presents a symposium on sentencing, begins
with a careful analysis of the aims of the criminal
law. This analysis emphasizes the importance of un-
derstanding the action of the handling of convicted
offenders upon the people, who are expected to
assume responsibility in the support of the law.
Thus, we are told that the method of the criminal
law involves more than the threat of community
condemnation. It must involve also the expression
of this condemnation in the form of punishment.
"Today", continues the article, " 'treatment' has
become a fashionable" euphemism for the older,
ugly word [punishment]. This bowdlerizing of the
Constitution and of conventional speech may serve
a useful purpose in discouraging unduly harsh sen-
tences and emphasizing that punishment is not an
end in itself. But to the extent that it dissociates
the treatment of criminals from the social con-
demnation of their conduct which is implicit in
their conviction, there is danger that it will confuse
thought and do a disservice". These are wise words
and worthy of careful consideration by many so-
ciologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists who
tend to overlook or ignore the moral, psychological,
and political implications of the method of the
criminal law and seek to give more and more of the
power of the courts to administrative boards and
commissions which are largely beyond the control
of the people. These exponents of "treatment" are
strongly represented in the symposium.
However, the most valuable part of the sympo-
sium is devoted to a discussion of sentencing under
the Model Penal Code of the American Law Insti-
tute and a critique of this code. Much of the
opposition to this code is summed up in the critique
in these words: "A high proportion of sentences
today are too long-twenty-five per cent are com-
mitments of ten years or over. Such terms are in-
consistent with present correctional knowledge and
experience. They mislead the public as to the
dangerousness of most offenders. Under the Code
proposals, they would be lengthened, through the
proposed maximum terms, minimum terms, parole
terms, and other provisions."
Few would disagree that we should make every
effort to rehabilitate the offender-and this the
1959]
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critique emphasizes-but sentencing must con-
template more than the interests of the offender
and his future behavior. The feelings and values of
law-abiding people and the community's moral
code must also be given due consideration. These
receive little attention in the critique or, as a
matter of fact, in most of the other articles in the
symposium. Although one may question whether
this symposium is balanced and unified, as the
editors hoped that it would be, it has rendered a
valuable service in making the discussion and the
critique of sentencing under the Model Penal Code
of the Americzan Law Institute available to both
the student of criminology and the general reader.
The symposium in the second issue is "designed
primarily to focus upon the diversity of view-
points" prevalent in the area of crime and correc-
tion. "'To accomplish this, it seeks to present a
strong, partisan exposition of the legal, psychiatric,
and sociological viewpoints, respectively, followed
by a critique of each." Unfortunately, this sym-
posium does not contain a systematic analysis of
of the legal approach, and this approach, therefore
tends to be smothered by its critique and the article
on the psychiatric approach, both of which are
written by psychiatrists. However, these are more
than offset by the slashing attack on psychiatry
and its practitioners which is made in the critique
of the psychiatric approach. Although the reader
may not desire to go so far as the critique does
when it asserts, "Psychiatric testimony should not
be admissible in court," this critique constitutes
an indictment that cannot easily be pushed aside.
One wishes that the symposium had a similar
critique of the sociological approach. Certainly it
would be difficult to imagine where one could find
better examples of fuzzy thinking, vague concepts,
shifting principles, and the perversion of science
than in the field of sociology.
The sociological approach in the symposium is
so handled that it becomes to a great extent a de-
fense of the differential association theory of
criminology. This theory, it turns out, is not really
a theory after all but "a broad point of.view for
approaching an understanding of criminals" which
must be supplemented with certain personality
mechanisms-mechanisms which in other language
have been used for many years by psychologists.
The impossibility of proving this so-called theory
is nonchalantly tossed off as "a crucial problem"-
the understatement of the entire symposium.
After this the symposium slides into a morass of
misconceptions, distortions, and half-truths en-
titled, "A Critique of the Sociological Approach to
Crime and Correction." This infelicitous perfor-
mance is really no critique at all. In fact, it rarely
rises above a hysterical denunciation of everyone
who does not agree with a certain cult of criminol-
ogy. Perhaps a more careful reading of some of the
material criticized might have helped to induce a
calmer mood. In any event, it is regretable that
this important task was not entrusted to steadier
and more competent hands.
Next we are informed that the emergence of the
concept "white-collar crime" is "possibly the most
significant recent development in criminology."
This ecstatic note is sounded in a strange prolifer-
ation of scientific pretentions and special pleading.
In this, white-collar crime becomes a propagandis-
tic weapon, which under the meretricious guise of
science, is to be used for the establishment of a new
social order. Apparently sociologists are to be
mechanics of collectivism. Some sociologists may
want to play this role, but let them not delude
themselves into believing that they are being scien-
tific.
In view of the fact that so little is known about
human behavior, humility is an essential element
in any study of crime and correction. There is
little humility in this symposium but a great deal
of arrogance and too often the making of a point at
the cost of intellectual honesty. It appears that
some psychiatrists would have us submit to the
rule of a few psychiatric "experts." This greatly
distresses some sociologists-not because there will
be an inordinate amount of power in the hands of
a few "experts," but because these "experts" may
not be sociologists.
Neither at present, nor in the foreseeable future,
can any single approach, or a combination of all
approaches, provide us with all the answers in the
field of criminology. Is it not sensible, then, that
we press along all approaches, and while being
understanding and tolerant of one another's in-
adequacies, utilize to the full all available re-
sources to advance our knowledge of the very
complex problems of crime and correction?
In accordance with the plans of the editors of
Law and Contemporary Problems, this symposium
presents some strongly partisan expositions on
crime and correction. Despite the hopes of the
editors, however, it does not seem that this sympo-
sium will "further cross-disciplinary communica-
tion, understanding, and appreciation." Perhaps
[Vol. so
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this is too much to expect of any symposium in a




POLITICAL AND CrvIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES. (2nd. edition) Two volumes. By Thonms
I. Emerson and David Haber. Buffalo: Dennis &
Co., Inc., 1959, pp. 757 and 779. $36.00.
A giant two volume collection of cases and ma-
terials is notsuitable for a brief analytic reviewand
a second edition of an already established work
needs no such review. Those familiar with the
first edition will find the revision remains the
most comprehensive collection of cases and ma-
terials on political and civil rights. Readers of this
JouRNAL, however, will be disappointed to learn
that the authors felt space limitations compelled
them to omit from the second edition the section
on rights of individuals in criminal proceedings.
The authors apologize for this, their most "painful
omission" by pointing out'that the material "is
treated in courses and texts on criminal law and is
more readily available than most other aspects of
the field." The other omissions acknowledged by
the authors are extended treatment of the rights
of aliens and systematic discussion of the activities
of private associations. In addition, no significant
attention is given to the impact of the military
departments on political and civil rights, a problem
of growing importance in these days of large citizen
armies and extensive military activity.
Although I do not seriously quarrel with their
allotment of space, I wonder if the extended treat-
ment of academic freedom, involving as it does
essentially the same considerations as other aspects
of freedom of expression, is worth the price of hav-
ing to disregard organized society's use of coercive
sanctions. The nature of police and prosecuting
procedures are equally significant in distinguishing
between a police and a free state as are the re-
straints on legislatures. Moreover, some of these
materials, the law of arrests, limits on police ques-
tioning, and so on, are no more readily available
than many of the included Supreme Court deci-
sions. Less attention to what the Supreme Court
justices have said and more attention to the
activities of other governmental agencies might
have made for better balanced coverage of the
problems of civil and political freedoms in the
United States.
What is covered is covered extensively. The
materials are grouped under the headings of the
right to security of the person (perhaps it could be
more accurately titled the problem of federal civil
rights enforcement), the right of franchise, freedom
of speech, academic freedom, freedom of religion,
and discrimination. The leading state and federal
cases are generously reprinted so that a full under-
standing of the underlying dilemmas can be ap-
preciated. Key provisions of basic laws and perti-
nent executive orders and rules of administrative
tribunals are made available. There are extended
excerpts from leading journals, including W. G.
Eliasberg's "Remarks on the Psychopathology of
Pornography" which appeared originally in the
April, 1942, number of this JOURNAL.
The authors' notes and bibliographies are out-
standing. They trace the background, furnish a
compilation of major legal references, introduce
some of the relevant non-legal materials, and focus
attention on the ramifications of central problems.
My quarrel is with the publisher. It is that of a
teacher who has been deprived for all practical
purposes of an excellent text. In their first edition
Emerson and Haber stated that their primary
purpose was to provide a collection of materials
for classroom use and only secondarily to produce
a reference work. The first edition was just that.
For a cost of $10 we had a volume of 1200 pages
of cases and texts. The second edition gives us 1500
pages in two volumes but a cost of S36. Even in
these days few, if any, teachers would dare to as-
sign such an expensive book as required student
reading. For this purpose the book would be better
if it were less comprehensive, less handsomely
printed, and less expensive. The second edition is
an invaluable text, that is too valuable. It will have
to be used primarily as a referenc6 book to be found
only in the libraries of major institutions and in the
collections of the more affluent professionals for
whom it is a tax-deductible expense. They will find




A THERAPY FOR AXIETY TEN'sIox REACTIONS.
By Gerhard B. Haugen, M.D.; Henry I. Dixon,
M.D.; and Herman A. Dickel, M.D. New York:
Macmillan Company, 1958, x + 110, 83.50.
